Here is a list of papers that we might be discussing through the year. It is expected that all of us will have read each paper in advance of the meeting in which that paper is to be discussed.
You are welcome to come up with other papers in your area of interest, but tell me first why they are good to be read together.
If you are looking for additional papers bear in mind that this is a theory reading group. This implies that it should be theory and make sense to read the paper together. In particular, we want to understand these papers (and the mechanics/proofs behind) better by reading them jointly. A good start to look for papers not in the list below are general interest journals or leading theory journals in economics.
Some Papers (in no particular order):
Qingmin Liu, Konrad Mierendorff, Xianwen Shi, and Weijie Zhong, Auctions with Limited Commitment
Matthew Elliott and Ben Golub, A Network Approach to Public Goods
Matthew Elliott, Ben Golub and Matthew Jackson, Financial Networks and Contagion
Debraj Ray and Rajiv Vohra, "Games of Love and Hate"
Antony Millner, Time consistency and time invariance in collective intertemporal choice
Annie Liang and Xiaosheng Mu, Complementary Information and Learning Traps
Annie Liang, Xiaosheng Mu and Vasilis Syrgkanis, Dynamically Aggregating Diverse Information
Mohammad Akbarpour and Shengwu Li, Credible Auctions: A Trilemma
Elliot Lipnowski and Doron Ravid, Cheap Talk with Transparent Motives
Doron Ravid, Anne-Katrin Roesler and Balazs Szentes, Learning Before Trading: On the Inefficiency of Ignoring Free Information
Andrew McClellan, Experimentation and Approval Mechanisms
Daniel Clark, Drew Fudenberg and Alex Wolitsky: Steady-State Equilibria in Anonymous Repeated Games, I: Trigger Strategies in General Stage Games and Steady-State Equilibria in Anonymous Repeated Games, II: Coordination-Proof Strategies in the Prisoner's Dilemma
Alex Wolitsky, Learning from Others' Outcomes
Larry Samuelson and Ennio Stacchetti, "Even Up: Maintaining Relationships."
Motty Perry and Phil Reny, "How to Count Citations if You Must."
Alexander Reffgen and Lars-Gunnar Svensson, "Strategy-proof voting for multiple public goods."
A. Lizzeri and L. Yariv, "Collective Self-Control."
O Compte and P. Jehiel, "The Coalitional Nash Bargaining Solution."
Jon Eguia and Dimitrios Xefteris, Implementation by vote-buying mechanisms
Volker Nocke and Nicolas Schutz, Multiproduct-Firm Oligopoly: An Aggregative GamesApproach
Ron Siegel and Bruno Strulovici, Judicial Mechanisms
Bruno Strulovici and Harry Di Pei, Crime Entanglement, Deterrence, and Witness Credibility
Piotr Dworczak and Alessandro Pavan, Robust Bayesian Persuasion
Branden Daley and Brett Green Bargaining and News
George Georgiadis and Balasz Szentes Optimal Monitoring Design
Yuliy Sannikov and Andy Skrypacz Impossibility of Collusion under Imperfect Monitoring with Flexible Production
Jacopo Perogo and Sevgi Yuksel Media Competition and Social Disagreement
Yeon-Koo Che and Johannes Hoerner Recommender Systems as Mechanisms for Social Learning"
Tilman Boergers and Jingtao Li Strategically Simple Mechanisms
Philippe Aghion, Mathias Dewatripont, Jeremy Stein Academic freedom, private-sector focus, and the process of innovation
Piero Gottardi and Claudio Mezzetti Mediation Design
Jesse Bull and Joel Watson Statistical Evidence and the Problem of Robust Litigation
Nima Haghpanah, Nageeb Ali, Xiao Lin and Ron Siegel How to Sell Hard Information
Kfir Eliaz and Ran Spiegler A Model of Competing Narratives
Jacopo Bizzotto, Jesper Rudiger, and Adrien VigierDynamic Persuasion with Outside Information
Igor Letina and Armin Schmutzler Inducing Variety: A Theory of Innovation COntests
Canice Prendergast Creative Fields
Steve Callander and Niko MatouschekThe Novelty of Innovation: Competition, Disruption, and Antitrust Policy
Li, Hao and We Li Misinformation