I am an assistant professor at Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.

I work on Microeconomic Theory and its applications in both Industrial Organization and Law & Economics.

law and economics

Optimal Alternative Dispute Resolution (with Benjamin Balzer) — accepted for publication, RAND Journal of Economics

If you want to settle a legal dispute without the need of (further) discovery, but you cannot guarantee full settlement, then the optimal ADR protocol has the following properties: (i) a neutral-third party manages the information flow, (ii) the information disputants obtain from participating in the negotiations is independent from the information they provide in the process, (iii) even ex-ante symmetric parties are treated asymmetrically during the process, (iv) settlement is not guaranteed for any potential constellation. [pdf], [program ADR (matlab)]

The Wrong Kind of Information (with Aditya Kuvalekar and João Ramos)

A bureaucrat decides whether to approve a project based on his information, only a part of which is verifiable in court. Is more precise verifiable information always better? [pdf]

Bankruptcy Laws and Debt Roll-Over (work in progress) (with Florian Exler)

If a borrower is in financial distress, he has better information whether this due to a (shorter) dry spell or because his investment is fundamentally rotten. That information is valuable to banks who have to decide whether to roll-over credit or to foreclose. Bankruptcy laws affect banks decisions and thus prices in the credit market.

conflict management

Belief Management in Conflict Resolution (NEW VERSION COMING SOON) (with Benjamin Balzer — reject&resubmit JET)

Arbitration problems boil down to information design problems. The arbitrator always has to solve the information design problem, once she has done that, designing the arbitration problem is mechanical. [pdf]

firms and organization

On Risk and Time Pressure: When to Think and When to Do (with Christoph Wolf)

You have a deadline to solve a problem. When should you use known methods, when should you think about developing a new one? How often should you switch between approaches? [pdf]

Persuading to Participate: Coordination on a Standard (with Benjamin Balzer)

Coordination on standards is hard if firms have private information the quality of their innovations. A firm can persuade a competitor to participate in the SSO by credibly threatening to release information about its own quality. Vaporware, Newsleakage, and Betaversions are potential business strategies to exercise the threat [pdf]

Persuasion, Pandering, and Sequential Proposal

How would an agent decide on the order of proposing projects to a principal? An accepted proposal forces the agent to work on it, once rejected it is hard to convince the principal to take up the project again. Is it wise to propose the agent-preferred project early on? Should she wait to signal that this truly is a good project?

science of science

A Quest for Knowledge (with Christoph Wolf)

A researcher is standing on the shoulders of giants selects a research question. Which one will she pick? How comitted is she finding an answer? Is ex-post or ex-ante funding of research more effective?

learning in games

Discriminating between Models of Learning - An Experimental Study with Intra-Team Communication (work in progress) (with Stefan Penczynski)

Johannes Schneider

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Department of Economics
Calle Madrid 126
28903 Getafe, Spain
Phone: +34 91 624 9357
email: jschneid@eco.uc3m.es