I am an assistant professor at Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.

I work on Economic Theory and its applications to Innovation, Technological Change, and the Law.

I am on leave from Madrid for the academic year 21-22
staying at the University of Mannheim as a CRC TR24 researcher.

law and economics

Managing a Conflict: Optimal Alternative Dispute Resolution (with Benjamin Balzer)
— RAND Journal of Economics, 52, 2021

Suppose some private information is relevant in a law suit only: How should we design ADR to settle outside the court?
[WP], [Twttr], [matlab]

The Wrong Kind of Information (with Aditya Kuvalekar and João Ramos— revise&resubmit @ RAND Journal of Economics)

An agent decides whether to approve a project based on his information, only a part of which is verifiable in court. Is more precise (un)verifiable information always better? [pdf]

Bankruptcy Laws and Debt Roll-Over (work in progress) (with Florian Exler)

If a borrower is in financial distress, he has better information whether this due to a (shorter) dry spell or because his investment is fundamentally rotten. That information is valuable to banks who have to decide whether to roll-over credit or to foreclose. Bankruptcy laws affect banks decisions and thus prices in the credit market.

science of science

A Quest for Knowledge (NEW VERSION) (with Christoph Carnehl)

A researcher is standing on the shoulders of giants and selects a research question. Which one will she pick? How invested is she to find an answer? [pdf], [slides], [video], [Twttr], [matlab], [mathematica]

firms and organization

Persuading to Participate: Coordination on a Standard (with Benjamin Balzer)
— International Journal of Industrial Organization, 78, 2021

Coordination on standards is hard if firms have private information on the quality of their innovations. A firm can persuade a competitor to join the SSO by credibly threatening to release information about its own quality. Vaporware, Newsleakage, and Beta versions are potential business strategies to exercise the threat. [pdf]

On Risk and Time Pressure: When to Think and When to Do (with Christoph Carnehl — revise&resubmit @ JEEA)

You have a deadline to solve a problem. When should you use known methods, when should you think about developing a new one? How often should you switch between approaches? [pdf]

conflict management

Belief Management in Conflict Resolution (NEW VERSION COMING SOON) (with Benjamin Balzer — reject&resubmit JET)

Arbitration problems boil down to information design problems. The arbitrator always has to solve the information design problem, once she has done that, designing the arbitration problem is mechanical. [pdf]

Persuasion, Pandering, and Sequential Proposal

How would an agent decide on the order of proposing projects to a principal? An accepted proposal forces the agent to work on it, once rejected it is hard to convince the principal to take up the project again. Is it wise to propose the agent-preferred project early on? Should she wait to signal that this truly is a good project?

learning in games

Discriminating between Models of Learning - An Experimental Study with Intra-Team Communication (work in progress) (with Stefan Penczynski)

Johannes Schneider

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Department of Economics
Calle Madrid 126
28903 Getafe, Spain
Phone: +34 91 624 9357
email: jschneid@eco.uc3m.es